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1. The case law unifying judgment No. 15/20131
The discussion of  whether the distribution of  sound made by speakers that 
extend it - but that are not a part of  the television or radio device - going beyond the 
mere reception, resulting in a new broadcast of  the programme, was the subject of  
a wide judicial disagreement at the national level.
For some, it was considered to be a crime of  misuse, punishable by virtue 
of  Article 195 (1) and Article 197 (1) of  the Copyright and Related Rights Code 
(hereinafter CRRC). The fact that the person in charge of  the establishment 
amplified the sound of  the broadcast, arguably, meant that this broadcast was being 
disseminated to a diverse audience through a television and a separate speakers set, 
without the consent of  the authors of  the songs or their representatives. 
It was, therefore, understood that the agent, when connecting the speakers to 
the television, did not just make a mere reception of  a television programme in 
public; the agent was also broadcasting signals, sounds and images. Thus, it was held 
that there was a need for the authorization from the authors of  works that were 
broadcasted.2 
For others, the aforementioned conduct did not constitute the practice of  
the crime of  misuse, distinguishing between receiving transmission and reception 
amplification and considering that only the first lacked authorization, for it took on 
the characteristics of  a new communication-broadcasting of  the work to the public.3
The case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013 (hereinafter, CLUJ) of  the 
Portuguese Supreme Court of  Justice (henceforth, SCJ) terminated that dispute by 
establishing case law concluding that “the application of  sound amplification devices to a 
television, broadcasting by television channel, in a commercial establishment, does not constitute a 
new use of  the broadcasted work and therefore does not require authorization of  its author, thus 
this practice does not perpetrate the crime of  misuse, foreseen and punishable by Articles 149, 195 
and 197 of  the Copyright and Related Rights Code.”
The SCJ reinforced its position by citing relevant doctrine and jurisprudence 
such as, the Opinion No. 4/92 of  the Advisory Council of  the Prosecutor-General’s 
Office.4 It also analysed the applicable legal provisions.5
The Court then, proceeded to distinguish between reception and 
communication: “the reception is to capture through the appropriate 
equipment the signals and sounds and images broadcasted by the 
transmitter...It is the terminus of  the transmission process and it alone 
justifies it: it is transmitted by broadcast to the receiver. This use of  
works by the receiver naturally confers the authors the right to use (and 
the consequent right to remuneration for such use) in accordance with 
1 Published in Diário da República, 1st series, No. 243, of  16 December 2013, 6821-6828. 
2 See the Seizure Order the Court of  Appeal of  Oporto of  03.08.1995 (case No. 9311103), the Court 
of  Appeal of  Lisbon of  17.02.2002 (case No. 85665) and of  15.05.2007 (case No. 72/2007-5) and 
the Court of  Appeal of  Guimarães of  02.07.2007 (case No. 974/07.2), available at www.dgsi.pt. 
3 Cf., In this sense, among others, the judgments of  the Court of  Appeal of  Guimarães of  
04.04.2011 (case No. 1130 07.3TABRG.G1), the Court of  Appeal of  Lisbon of  22.03.2011 (case 
No. 147/04.4SXLSB.L1, 5th) and the Court of  Appeal of  Oporto of  19.09.201 2 ratio (case/2 No. 
131/11.GEGDM.P1), available at www.dgsi.pt. 
4 Voted on 05.28.1992 and approved on 07.27.1992. 
5 Among others, Article 42 (1) and (2) of  the Constitution of  the Portuguese Republic, and Articles 
67, 68, 149, 155, 195 and 197 of  the CRRC. 
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paragraph 1 of  Article 149. However, once authorized, the reception is 
free, that is, the receiver may organize it at will, providing that it remains 
within the reception’s scope. It is therefore necessary to distinguish 
between the mere reception (signal reception) and the reuse of  the work 
provided for in Article 149 (2). This provision has to refer to situations 
where the transmission adds, modifies, or innovates, thus constituting a 
new use of  the work. This new use necessarily requires any modification 
by technical means in the form of  reception in order to draw on it to 
produce a spectacular visual or sound effect, to create an enactment that 
the mere reception of  the broadcasted programme does not create.”6
It will be the case referred to in the judgment and defended by Oliveira 
Ascensão,7  that will determine whether or not entry payment occurs: “all aimed at 
attracting a wider audience than that which would normally occur in the establishment.”8
Referring to C-162/10 of  the CJEU9 the SCJ says that “the same solution will be 
accepted in the case of  a multiplied reception, as in hotels, where the reception is distributed in the 
rooms and common rooms, which translates, in addition to the exponential amplification of  the 
broadcasted signal, in an extra service provided by the hotel to the guests, likely to attract clientele, 
and therefore profits, so it can be considered a work reuse, for which remuneration is due.”10
Despite being fully aware of  the contrary position advocated by the CJEU11 
one may also read in the aforementioned CLUJ that “such will no longer will be the case 
of  the mere reception in cafes or bars open to most people, with no payment of  entry requirement, 
establishments which traditionally represent conviviality or meeting places, especially in small 
communities, but not limited to them, in which the uptake of  television programmes can operate 
occasionally as a special decoy, but usually only serves the established clientele for which it is not an 
attraction.”
Consequently, the mere reception, even if  changed by accessory equipment – 
including speakers and that may not originally be part of  the device – provided it is 
limited to the function enhancement/improvement, Article 149 (2) of  the CRRC, 
does not apply, otherwise the use of  the same work would imply a double recovery 
of  rights.12
2. The directive on copyright and related rights 
Directive 2001/29/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  22 
May 2001 on the harmonization of  certain aspects of  copyright and related rights in the 
information society, was transposed into Portuguese law by Law No. 50/2004, of  24 
August, introducing therefore amendments to the Decree-Law No. 63/85, of  14 May.13 
6 Vide, A.U.J n.º 15/2013, in Diário da República, 1st series, No. 243, of  16 December 2013, 6827. 
7 In Direito Civil - Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos, 2008, 311 and 312. 
8 Vide, A.U.J n.º 15/2013, in Diário da República, 1st series, No. 243, of  16 December 2013, 6827. 
9 Judgment of  the CJEU of  15.03.2010. 
10 Idem ibidem. 
11 Specifically, in footnote 7 it is expressly referred Case C-403/08 and 429/08, both of  04.10.2011. 
12 In addition, and for the purposes of  intellectual property as a fundamental right, see Luís Couto 
Gonçalves, in Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia Comentada, Alessandra Silveira and 
Mariana Canotilho (eds.), Almedina, 2013, p. 221 ff. 
13 Under international law it is urgent to recall that the European Community has approved, 
through Decision 94/800/EC of  22 December 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of  
Intellectual Property Rights, which constitutes Annex 1 C to the Agreement establishing the World 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 2,  June 2016
85 Carla Machado
It can be read in its recitals that this legal instrument is based on principles and 
rules already established in the directives in force in the field of  intellectual property, 
implementing some of  the obligations under international law14 and developing and 
integrating them within the perspective of  the information society.
One of  the underlying purposes of  the adoption of  the directive under review 
was the further harmonization of  copyright laws applicable to communication of  works 
to the public. These should, therefore, be understood in a broad sense, as covering 
any transmission or retransmission of  a work to the public by wire or wireless means, 
including broadcasting.
Notwithstanding, it should be recalled that this directive states, on the one hand, 
that such harmonization is based on a high level of  protection – as copyright and related 
rights are believed to be crucial to intellectual creation – and, on the other, the attribution 
to authors, interpreters and/or performers of  an appropriate reward for the use of  their 
work, so that they may continue their creative and artistic work.
Furthermore, a fair balance of  rights and interests between the different categories 
of  right holders must be safeguarded, as well as between the different categories of  right 
holders and users of  protected material.
Otherwise, the exclusive right of  reproduction should be subject to an exception 
to allow certain acts of  temporary reproduction, which are transient or incidental 
reproductions, forming an integral and essential part of  a technological process for the 
sole purpose of  enabling either efficient transmission in a network between third parties 
by an intermediary, or a lawful use of  a work or other protected subject matter. The 
acts of  reproduction concerned should have no inherent economic value. To the extent 
that these conditions are met, this exception should include acts which enable browsing 
and acts of  caching, including those permitting the efficient operation of  transmission 
systems, provided that the intermediary does not modify the content of  the transmission 
and does not interfere with the lawful use of  technology, widely recognized and used by 
the industry, to obtain data on the use of  the information. Finally, consideration is given 
to the fact that a use should be considered legitimate if  it is authorized by the right holder 
and is not restricted by law.
Article 3 (1) of  that directive, entitled “Right of  communication to the public of  works,” 
including the right of  making available to the public other subject-matter, states 
that “Member States shall provide the authors with the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any 
communication to the public of  their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to 
the public in order to make them accessible to anyone from the local and at the time individually chosen 
by them.”
With direct relevance to the present case, and despite being an earlier version prior 
to the transposition of  the directive, consideration should be given to the provisions of  
Article 149 (2) of  the CRRC, which prescribes that the communication of  works in any 
public place by any means serving to broadcast signals, sounds or images is subject to 
authorization. In turn, Article 155 of  the same law provides that; “remuneration is due also 
to the author for public communication of  the broadcasted work by loudspeaker or any other analogous 
Trade Organization (WTO) signed in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 (commonly referred to as the 
TRIPS Agreement). In turn, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted in 
Geneva on 20 December 1996, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, which were approved by the European Community through Decision 2000/278/
EC of  16 March 2000. 
14 In particular, Directive 92/100/EEC of  the Council of  19 November 1999 on the rental right 
and lending agreement and certain rights related to copyright in the field of  intellectual property. 
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instrument transmitting signals, sounds or images.”
Finally, Articles 195 and 197 punish, as a crime of  misuse, whoever, without 
permission of  the author, or artist, the producer of  phonogram and or the broadcasting 
organization, uses a work or performance by any of  the forms provided for in the CRRC.
3. The case law of  the CJEU
At this point, it is necessary to pay attention to the CJEU case law. In the judgment 
of  4 October 2011, the CJEU ruled stating that “’communication to the public’ within the 
meaning of  Article 3 (1) of  the Copyright Directive must be interpreted as covering transmission of  the 
broadcast works, via a television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public house.”15 16
In casu, the facts were related with the grant of  television broadcasting rights for 
live coverage of  the Premier League, administered by the FAPL, which carries out 
such concession given the territorial basis and for three years.
In order to protect the territorial exclusivity, each of  the contracting parties 
undertakes to prevent the public from receiving their broadcasts outside the area for 
which they hold the license. This implies, on one hand, that emissions are securely 
encrypted in order to prevent their capture in an unencrypted form, and on the other, 
broadcasting bodies are prohibited from supplying decoding devices that allow their 
broadcasts to be decrypted with the view of  being used outside the territory for 
which they hold the license.
At the time, the holder of  such rights in the UK was BSkyB Ltd. Therefore, 
those wishing to screen these games in that country had to take out a commercial 
subscription from the aforesaid company. 
However, some establishments had begun to use foreign decoding devices to 
access Premier League matches, which were manufactured and marketed with the 
authorization of  the service provider for their dissemination in Greece, but were 
used in an unauthorized manner (outside the territorial space for which they had 
been marketed and provided). For this reason, the FAPL considered that these 
activities were detrimental to their interests for they affected the exclusivity of  the 
rights granted under license to a particular territory, and thus its value.
To achieve the abovementioned conclusion, the CJEU recalled that since 
Directive 2001/29/EC does not define the concept of  communication to the public, 
its meaning must be determined “in light of  the objectives pursued by the Copyright Directive 
[that we list above] and of  the context in which the provision being interpreted is set (SGAE, 
paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).”
More specifically, it held that Article 3 of  the copyright directive must be 
interpreted considering i) the establishment of  a higher level of  protection of  
copyright coupled with the right to adequate compensation for use of  the work, 
leading to a broad concept of  communication to the public; ii) the copyright directive 
is based on principles and rules already established in the directives in force in the 
field of  intellectual property, such as Directive 92/100,17 18 so taking into account the 
principle of  the Union’s legal unit and its coherence, the concepts used in all these 
15 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08. 
16 Cf. recital No. 207. 
17 Under Article 8 (3) of  the Directive on Related Rights the concept of  communication to the 
public includes the operation of  making the sounds or representations of  sounds fixed in a 
phonogram audible to the public, encompassing broadcasting or any communication to the public.   
18 Cf. Judgment of  the CJEU of  16 July 2009 (Infopaq International, C-5/08).
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Directives must have the same meaning unless the EU legislature has, in a specific 
legislative context, expressed a different intention,19 iii) international law, taking in 
particular account the Berne Convention20 and the Copyright Treaty.21
The CJEU, without neglecting the fact that the customer is present within the 
area covered by the broadcast, took for granted that the access to the broadcast 
transmission of  protected works via a television screen and speakers, was only 
possible due to the intervention and deliberate permission of  the pub owner.
Under this assumption – of  effective communication in the deliberate 
transmission of  broadcasted works – the CJEU put forward three criteria, to be 
appraised on a case by case basis by the law enforcer in order to determine what 
constitutes “communication to the public:”
i) Assess whether the broadcast work is transmitted to a new public, i.e., 
“a public that was not considered by the authors of  the protected works when they 
authorized its use by communication to the original public.”22 Here it is urgent 
to point out that “When those authors authorise a broadcast of  their works, they 
consider, in principle, only the owners of  television sets who, either personally or within 
their own private or family circles, receive the signal and follow the broadcasts. Where 
a broadcast work is transmitted, in a place accessible to the public, for an additional 
public which is permitted by the owner of  the television set to hear or see the work, an 
intentional intervention of  that kind must be regarded as an act by which the work in 
question is communicated to a new public”;
ii) Ascertain whether the broadcast work is being transmitted to “a public 
not present at the place where the communication originates.”23 It should, therefore, 
be stated that the concept of  communication to the public does not cover 
“direct representation or performances,” that is, the interpretation of  works 
before an audience that is in physical and direct contact with the author or 
performer of  those works;24
iii) Conclude on the profit-making nature of  the communication, which is 
reflected both in the attendance of  the establishment, and in its economic 
19 As the European Union legislator has not expressed a different will concerning the interpretation 
of  “communication to the public” in the copyright directive, particularly in Article 3, it shall be 
construed, as stated by the CJEU in the judgment under analysis, that the mentioned concept is 
aimed at “any transmission of  the protected works, irrespective of  the technical means or process used.” Moreover, 
following this interpretation in Judgement SGAE the CJEU ruled that an owner of  a hotel 
establishment carries out an act of  communication by allowing its clients to access the broadcast 
works via television sets, distributing in hotel rooms the received signal containing the protected 
works, with full knowledge of  the facts. This is because, it stresses, “such intervention is not just a 
technical means to ensure or improve reception of  the original broadcast in the catchment area, but an act without 
which those customers are unable to enjoy the broadcast works, although physically within that area.”  
20 Article 11 bis, (1), iii) of  the Berne Convention states that the concept of  communication to the 
public encompasses communication through a speaker or any other instrument transmitting signals, 
sounds or images, covering a means of  communication like displaying the works on a screen. 
21 Cf. recitals 185 to 189. 
22 See also the aforementioned Judgement SGAE and order Organismos Slllogikis Diacheirisis 
Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon. 
23 For the purposes of  the twenty-third recital of  the directive on copyright. 
24 Cf. Article 11, first paragraph of  the Berne Convention and the Guide of  the Convention 
that, despite constituting only an interpretative document and as such having no binding force, 
contributes to the interpretation of  the Convention, as highlighted in Judgement SGAE. 
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results.25 
Returning to the main proceedings, the CJEU concludes that the listed 
requirements were met. In fact, it found that the public in the pub was broader because 
it was not taken into account by the authors upon their approval of  the broadcasting 
of  their works. Furthermore, the physical and direct contact element would inevitably 
be excluded in the case of  transmission in a pub via a television screen and speakers to 
an audience that is not present at the place where the communication originates. And 
finally, one could not forget that the owner proceeded to transmit broadcasted works 
for profit, and that such communication was likely to attract customers interested in 
the transmitted works.
However, in the CJEU Judgment of  15 March 2012, Case C-135/10, it was 
understood that 
“The concept of  ‘communication to the public’ which appears in Council 
Directive 92/100/EEC of  19 November 1992 on rental right and lending 
right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of  intellectual 
property and Directive 2001/29/EC of  the European Parliament and of  
the Council of  22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of  certain aspects of  
copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted 
in the light of  the equivalent concepts contained in the convention, the 
agreement and the treaty mentioned above and in such a way that it is 
compatible with those agreements, taking account of  the context in which 
those concepts are found and the purpose of  the relevant provisions 
of  the agreements as regards intellectual property (…)The concept 
of  ‘communication to the public’ for the purposes of  Article 8(2) of  
Directive 92/100 must be interpreted as meaning that it does not cover the 
broadcasting, free of  charge, of  phonograms within private dental practices 
engaged in professional economic activity, such as the one at issue in the 
main proceedings, for the benefit of  patients of  those practices and enjoyed 
by them without any active choice on their part. Therefore, such an act of  
transmission does not entitle the phonogram producers to the payment of  
remuneration.”26
In the statement of  the facts, it reads that within Italy and outside the Italian 
territory, SCF (Società Consortile Fonografici) develops the collecting activity as an 
agent for the management, collection and distribution of  the rights of  its associated 
phonogram producers. 
In pursuit of  such activity, it started negotiations with the Italian Dentists Association 
with a view to concluding a collective agreement on the establishment of  an equitable 
remuneration amount for any communication to the public, including the one carried 
out in the offices of  private professional practices, which, however, failed.
Regarding the concept of  user, the CJEU recalled that it had already decided that 
the operator of  a hotel and a café-restaurant carries out an act of  communication to the 
public within the meaning of  Article 3 (1) of  Directive 2001/29/EC when it intervenes, 
in full knowledge of  the consequences of  its behaviours, to give its customers access 
25 Cf. recitals 198 to 205. 
26 Cf. operative part of  the judgment. 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 2,  June 2016
89 Carla Machado
to a broadcast containing the protected work, since without this intervention, and even 
though the customers are physically within the broadcast’s catchment area, they could 
not, in principle, enjoy the broadcasted work.
On the concept of  the public, it claims that it “refers to an indeterminate number of  
potential listeners, and, in addition, implies a fairly large number of  persons.”27 28
Returning to the present case, the CJEU did not hesitate in stating that customers 
only enjoyed the phonograms by reason of  the deliberate intervention of  the dentist. 
It also submitted that the dentist’s customers form a determinate circle of  potential 
recipients whose composition is stabilized, since generally people do not have access to 
treatment by this particular dentist.
Moreover, it was understood that the number of  people present in that practice at 
the same time is negligible: “(…) although there are a number of  patients in succession, the fact 
remains that, as those patients attend one at a time, they do not generally hear the same phonograms, or 
the broadcast phonograms, in particular.”29
Finally, there is not a cause-effect relationship between the broadcasting of  works 
and the increase in clientele, for unlikely to affect the dentist’s income.
With greater importance to the solution that we intend to put forward is, 
undoubtedly, the judgment30 of  the Court of  Justice of  14 July 2015, due to a reference 
for a preliminary ruling by the Court of  Appeal of  Coimbra, where it was questioned 
whether “the concept of  communication of  work to the public provided for in Article 3 (1) of  Directive 
2001/29/EC must be interpreted as covering the transmission of  broadcasted works, in commercial 
establishments such as bars, cafes, restaurants or others with similar characteristics, through television 
receptor sets and the broadcasting of  which is magnified by speakers and/or amplifiers, setting by that 
extent, a new use of  works protected by copyright?”31 32
If  it is true that from the case law of  the CJEU does not results that the use 
of  technical means to ensure or improve the original broadcast in the catchment 
area enshrines the concept of  communication laid down in Article 3 (1) of  Directive 
2001/29/EC. one cannot overlook the fact that “the use of  speakers and/or amplifiers to 
increase the broadcasting of  sound (…) is not just a technical means to ensure or improve the original 
broadcast in the catchment area, since such intervention constitutes an act without which customers of  the 
27 Cf. Judgment Mediakabel of  2 June 2005, Case C-89/04,  and Lagardère Active Broadcast of  14 July 
2005, Case C-192/04. 
28 The “indeterminate nature of  public” is equivalent, according to the definition of  public 
broadcast of  the WIPO Glossary, to making “a work [...] perceptible in any appropriate manner to persons 
in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private group.” Meanwhile, a “a fairly large 
number of  people” is aimed at a certain de minimis threshold, therefore, excluding from this concept 
a small or even negligible group of  people. To determine this number account must be taken to the 
number of  people who have access to the same work and how many of  them have access to it in 
succession. 
29 Cf. Recital 96. 
30 Pursuant to Article 104 (3) of  the Rules of  Procedure of  the CJEU, if  the response is clearly 
deductible from its case law, the CJEU may decide by reasoned order. 
31 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of  Appeal of  Coimbra (Portugal) on 30 March 
2015, Case C-151/15 (2015/C 205/229) published in the Official Journal of  the European Union 
of  22.06.2015 in which the appellant is the Portuguese Society of  Authors CRL and the defendant 
is the Prosecutor’s Office. 
32 Although we tend to think that by virtue of  the doctrine of acte clair (which is reinforced by the 
fact that the matter has been decided by a mere order) national courts were able to resolve the 
matter in accordance with Union law per se, we welcome the position taken by the Court of  Appeal 
of  Coimbra to proceed with the reference for preliminary ruling, thus contradicting the majority 
view of  the case law that has followed, without further ado, the CLUJ No. 15/2013. 
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establishment in question cannot in principle enjoy the works broadcast, although they are within the said 
area (see in this sense, SGAE, C-306/05, EU:C:2006:764, recital°42).”33
As to the remainder, it should always be noted that “like the customers of  a hotel, 
customers of  a cafe-restaurant come and go quickly and are usually a rather large number of  people and 
should be considered as public, given the main objective of  Directive 2001/29, noted in recital 12 of  
this order (see in this sense, SGAE, C-306/05, EU:C:2006:764, recital 38).” And this public is 
new, i.e., an additional public which was not taken into account by the authors upon their 
authorisation for the broadcasting of  their works.
There are also no questions with respect to the non-existence of  physical and direct 
contact, inasmuch as the public present at the place where the transmission is made is not 
present at the location from which the communication originates.
Finally, and with regard to the “profit-making nature of  the communication to the public” 
the Court has stated that “this transmission is likely to attract customers interested by the works thus 
transmitted and wherein said transmission is consequently impacting the attendance of  the establishment 
and, in fine, in its economic results, such transmission is a communication to the public with profit-making 
purposes.” 34
Thus, the Court ends by ruling on the meaning of  
“the concept of  ‘communication to the public’ pursuant to Article 3 (1) of  Directive 
2001/29/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  22 May 2001 on the 
harmonization of  certain aspects of  copyright and related rights in the information society, 
must be interpreted as meaning that it covers the transmission, via a radio device connected to 
speakers and/or amplifiers, by the people who operate a cafe-restaurant, of  musical works 
and musical literary works broadcast by a radio station to customers who are present in such 
establishment.”35
4. The noncompliance of  the CLUJ. Consequences and possible 
solutions
Comparing the arguments put forward by the CJEU, set out in the various listed 
decisions, we maintain that, contrary to what is stated in the CLUJ No. 15/2013, if  the 
reception in a public place involves the use of  technical means – as are the speakers, 
loudspeakers or similar instruments – there is a retransmission and not just a reception 
expansion, which, provided that some criteria are met, justifies a new remuneration as 
provided for in Articles 155 and 149 (2) of  the CRRC, notwithstanding any criminal 
liability provided by the combined provisions of  Articles 195 and 197 of  the same law.
As such, and while the SCJ does not change the established case law, national courts 
must decide on the inapplicability of  CLUJ No. 15/2013. With the integration of  the 
Portuguese State in the European [Union] legal system36 we witnessed a phenomenon 
33 Cf. recital n.º 17. 
34 Cf. recital n.º 27. 
35 Order of  the Court of  Justice (Third Chamber) 2015/C 320/20, published in the Official Journal 
of  the European Union of  28/09/2015. 
36 In Judgement Faminio Costa v. E.N.E.L, of  15 July 1964, Case 6-64, the Court defined case law 
setting that the founding Treaties have created a legal framework, which should be respected by 
all national authorities “By creating a Community of  unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of  representation on the international plane and, more particularly, 
real powers stemming from a limitation of  sovereignty or a transfer of  powers from the States to the Com munity, 
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of  
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hitherto completely unknown: the coexistence of  two separate legal orders and, therefore, 
a relationship between organically European courts (from which we highlight the Court 
of  Justice for its unquestionable relevance as far as the preliminary ruling is concerned) 
and functionally European courts (national courts of  the Member States).
In the internal legal system, the case law unifying judgments are an indirect source 
of  law, given that, pursuant to Article 445 (3) of  the Criminal Procedure Code, they are 
not mandatory case law for the courts, thus being lawful for the judge to substantiate 
differences concerning the established case law.
On the contrary, the decisions of  the CJEU constitute a direct source of  law by 
allowing the uniformity and harmonization in the implementation of  Union law in the 
territory of  the Member States.
Thus, in addition to the express provision of  some of  the underlying principles 
of  EU law provided for in Article 2 TFEU,37 and some of  the general principles of  
EU law38 it is necessary to pay attention to the role of  the case law on principles of  the 
CJEU39 that still enjoy binding precedent, and it is particularly relevant in fixing principles 
and their subsequent densification.
It is clear from Article 4 TEU (the principle of  European loyalty or sincere 
cooperation)40 that the Union and the Member States respect and mutually assist each 
other in carrying out tasks emanating from the Treaties, being the Member States entrusted 
to adopt measures enabling the implementation of  obligations under the Treaties or 
resulting from the institutions of  the Union and, also, facilitate the achievement of  the 
Union’s task(s), refraining from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of  
those objectives.41
From the principle of  European loyalty, the CJEU decomposed a number of  other 
principles to ensure the objectives of  this Union of  law, based on criteria of  reciprocity 
and equality of  its citizens, from where we highlight the principle of  primacy, the principle 
of  conforming interpretation and the principle of  the Member State’s judicial liability for 
breaching European obligations. 
The principle of  primacy highlights the prevalence of  the Union law over non-
compliant national law, which derives from the preferred application of  some standards, 
equally and prima facie valid, although emanating from a different source.
It is internally embodied in Article 7 (6) and Article 8 (4) of  the Portuguese 
law which binds both their nationals and themselves.” More recently, in Judgement Segui, of  27 February 
2007, Case C-355/04P, the Court of  Justice reaffirmed the principle of  Union of  law, extending 
its preliminary rulings to 3rd pillar matters (which, to date, were already only limited to Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters) to ensure its own effective judicial protection. 
37 In the words of  Alessandra Silveira, these are the principles “that correspond to the foundations of  
European legal culture – rule of  law, democracy, fundamental rights,” in Princípios de Direito da União Europeia, 
Doutrina e Jurisprudência, 2nd updated and expanded edition, Quid Iuris, p.11. 
38 Still quoting the words of  Alessandra Silveira, in op. cit., p. 11, such will be the “principles that are 
directly or indirectly enrolled in the constituent treaties, constituting a normative reference presupposed by the very idea 
of  Union of  law, and make up material acts of  European public authorities.”  
39 On this subject see Jan Komárek, “Federal elements in the Community judicial system: building 
coherence in the Community legal order”, in Common Market Law Review, No. 42, 2005.
40 On the subject of  the principle of  loyalty by the CJEU see John Temple Lang, “Community 
constitutional law: Article 5 EEC Treaty”, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1990. 
41 With relevance to the case under analysis, it is urgent to remember that in Judgement Factortame, 
of  19 June 1990, Case C-213/89, the CJEU even said that, under the principle of  European loyalty, 
the courts must ensure the effective judicial protection of  rights arising from the legal order of  
the European Union from which therefore arises the obligation of  the court to disregard a rule of  
national law in order to ensure the application of  Union law. 
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Constitution, and addresses both the public administration and the national court, but 
mainly the latter, which is responsible for supervising and ensuring the application of  
Union law and its effective judicial protection.
Nonetheless, the national court should only draw on the principle of  primacy, 
pushing a rule of  national law incompatible with EU law, if  the interpretation of  
domestic law in light of  it is not enough to safeguard a right which the European legal 
order confers to the individual. Therefore, the principle of  conforming interpretation with Union 
law, which stems from the interpretation given by the CJEU to the combined provisions 
of  Article 4 (3) TEU and Article 288 (3) TFEU, requires the interpreter or administrator 
of  national law to ascribe to national provisions a meaning compliant or compatible with 
the provisions of  EU law.
In Von Colson42 the CJEU held that the obligation to interpret a national standard 
transposing a Directive in accordance with its text and purpose, requires the national 
court to give priority to the method – amongst the interpretation methods permitted 
by national law – enabling it to assign to the national provision at issue an interpretation 
consistent with the Directive. The interpretation thus made will only be limited by the 
general principles of  legal certainty and non-retroactivity.
Similarly, in Kolpinghuis43 the CJEU held that the conforming interpretation could 
not give rise to criminal liability that had not been established by a national law adopted 
to implement the Directive. On the other hand, and despite being under the provisions, 
at the date, of  the third pillar, it was decided in Maria Pupino44 that the principle of  
conforming interpretation could not serve to drive or increase the criminal liability of  
those who violate a framework decision nor serve as a basis for a contra legem interpretation 
of  national law.
But the CJEU goes even on the scope of  this principle. In Marleasing45 the Court 
held that this obligation exists not only with regard to national provisions designed to 
comply with the directive, but for the whole body of  rules of  national law.46  
Of  note, also, is the case law set in Marks & Spencer47  towards granting individuals 
the right to invoke the provisions of  a Directive against the Member State in all cases 
where its full implementation is not, in fact, secured, that is, not only in cases of  failure 
to transpose or when it has been incorrectly transposed, but also in the event that the 
national measures are not applied in order to achieve the result sought by it.
It is, therefore, difficult to understand the position advocated by the SCJ upon the 
making of  the CLUJ No. 15/2013. Without going into the details of  the arguments 
adduced as to whether the use of  speakers constitutes an act of  receiving/transmitting 
a broadcast or enlarged reception, we cannot fail to note that the SCJ, when taking a 
position on this matter, does so with full knowledge of  the case law of  the CJEU and 
in defiance of  it, quoting even in a footnote the CJEU’s jurisprudence in the opposite 
direction to the position advocated.
Imposing itself  to the judge interpreting a provision of  national law in the light 
of  EU law – and if  such an interpretation is not sufficient to safeguard a right that 
42 Judgment Von Colson, of  10 April 1984, Case 14/83. 
43 Judgment Kolpinghuis, of  8 October 1987, Case 80/86. 
44 Judgment Maria Pupino, of  16 June 2005, Case C-105/03. 
45 Judgment Marleasing, of  13 November 1990, Case C-106/89. 
46 This qualitative leap comes as a result of  the principle of  loyal cooperation and will be valid, as 
set out in recital 9 of  the Opinion of  Advocate General Van Gerven, even if  those provisions have 
been adopted earlier, that is, not to comply with the Directive. 
47 Judgment Marks & Spencer, of  11 July 2002, Case C-62/00. 
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European law confers on the individual, determining the obligation to suppress the 
national standard –, a fortiori, we can conclude that the national court, when faced with 
a situation like the one depicted in the unifying judgment, “communication of  the work to 
the public” provided for in Article 149 (2) and in Article 155 both from the CRRC must 
be interpreted under the terms adopted by the CJEU in the various decisions that we 
mention, which necessarily imply the non-application of  the CLUJ (which is not an 
immediate source of  law even at national level).
In particular, and in the wake of  the CJEU’s decisions enunciated, we advocate that 
the national court needs to draw on the following criteria:
i) User: the one who intervenes, in full knowledge of  the consequences of  
its behaviour, to give access to its customers of  a broadcast containing the 
protected work, whether these customers are or not within the emission zone, 
given that they only have access to the transmission by virtue of  the deliberate 
intervention of  the owner of  the establishment;
ii) Public:
• Unspecified number of  potential recipients - the work is perceived 
in an appropriate manner by a general audience, as opposed to specific 
individuals belonging to a private group;
• Significant number of  people (as opposed to a possible insignificant 
number) who have access to the same work and how many of  them have 
access to it in succession;
• The work is transmitted to a new public, i.e., additional public or not 
considered as original public for approval of  the communication;
• The work is transmitted to a public not present at the place where the 
communication originates;
iii) Profit-making nature: the owner is transmitting the works for profit; there 
is a cause-effect relationship between the diffusion of  works and the increase 
in clientele.
Having met these criteria and the other factors of  the objective and subjective 
type of  the crime of  misuse, the delivery of  an order of  prosecution/pronunciation 
is imposed, since it is not apparent that the conforming interpretation is prejudicial 
to legal certainty or to the aggravation of  responsibility prohibited by the case law of  
the CJEU  and by national law, even though, in very exceptional cases, one can admit 
the existence of  error on unlawfulness. 
Having met these criteria and the other factors of  the objective and subjective 
type of  the crime of  misuse, the delivery of  an order of  prosecution/pronunciation 
is imposed, since it is not apparent that the conforming interpretation is prejudicial 
to legal certainty or to the aggravation of  responsibility prohibited by the case law 
of  the CJEU48  and by national law, even though, in very exceptional cases, one can 
48 Merely by the way of  example in Judgement Kolpinghuis – given that the directive in question in 
this case had not yet been transposed into Italian law – the CJEU ruled that “that obligation on the 
national court to refer to the content of  the directive when interpreting the relevant rules of  its national law is limited 
by the general principles of  law which form part of  Community law and in particular the principles of  legal certainty 
and non-retroactivity (...) [wherefore] a directive cannot, of  itself  and independently of  a national law adopted by 
a Member State for its implementation, have the effect of  determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of  
persons who act in contravention of  the provisions of  that directive” (emphasis added). 
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admit the existence of  error on unlawfulness.49
Should it not succeed, and the national court decides to blindly follow the 
CLUJ No. 15/2013 – as happened, for example, in the Seizure Order by the Court 
of  Appeal of  Coimbra, dated of  10/14/2015 –,50 the principle of  State liability for 
breach of  EU law comes into play with a view to safeguard the rights of  individuals, 
specifically the right to remuneration for public communication of  works, arising 
from obligations that the European legal order imposes on its Member States.
Let us turn once again to the case law of  the CJEU. In Köbler51 it was concluded, 
unequivocally, for the admissibility of  the Member State responsibility for the 
exercise of  judicial functions that imply the violation of  EU law. In fact, “the principle 
that Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to individuals by infringements of  
Community law for which they are responsible is also applicable where the alleged infringement stems 
from a decision of  a court adjudicating at last instance. Indeed, this principle, inherent in the system 
of  the Treaty, applies to any infringement of  Community law by a Member State, regardless of  the 
authority of  the Member State whose act or omission is responsible for the infringement.”52
It also considered that the principle of  Member State liability for infringement 
of  EU law – explicitly recognized in Francovich53 – more specifically, for acts or 
omissions of  a national court adjudicating at last instance, “does not affect the authority 
of  res judicata.”54 And it so happens because “proceedings with a view to render the State 
liable do not have the same purpose and do not necessarily involve the same parties as the proceedings 
leading to the decision that has acquired the authority of  res judicata. Indeed, the plaintiff  in an 
action for damages against the State will, if  successful, obtain the condemnation to the reparation 
of  the damage suffered, without calling into question the authority of  res judicata of  the judicial 
authority which caused the damage.”55
As for the criteria for State’s liability it is necessary to pay attention to the 
results of  Brasserie du Pêcheur.56 Consequently, the Member State must compensate the 
damage caused to the individual as a result of  the infringement of  EU law provided 
that i) the legal standard infringed confers rights on individuals, ii) the breach is 
sufficiently serious, and iii) there is a causal link between the infringement of  the 
obligation incumbent on the State and the damage suffered by the individual.57
49 Article 29 (1) of  the Constitution of  the Republic states that “no one can be criminally sentenced if  not 
pursuant to a previous law that declares the act or omission as punishable, nor endure security measures the preconditions 
of  which are not established in a previous law.” It is also established here the well-known principle of  legality 
in criminal law, also proclaimed in Article 1 (1) of  the Criminal Code. Although this is not the place for 
the necessary deepening of  this fundamental principle of  the rule of  law, we shall say that its primary 
function is of  a safeguarding nature as it seeks to undermine illegitimate and abusive exercises of  the 
State’s ius puniendi. Therefore, it continues to be postulated that only prosecution and punishment that 
simultaneously undergo the requirements of  foundation and criteria and the legal limits imposed by 
the principle in question can be said to be political and criminally legitimate, thus preserving legal 
certainty. In the present case, the principle of  legality was fully complied with. What existed was an 
interpretation by the Supreme Court of  Justice that decided to consider a certain conduct as atypical. 
This fact per se seemed to us insufficient to consider the ab initio infringement of  the principle of  legal 
certainty with the delivery of  a prosecution order/indictment. 
50 Case No 35/12.0PFVIS.C1. 
51 Judgment Köbler, of  30 September 2003, Case C-224/01. 
52 Cf. recitals n.ºs 1 and 2. 
53 Judgement Francovich, of  19 November 1991, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90. 
54 Cf. recital n.º 39. 
55 Cf. recital n.º 39. 
56 Judgment Brasserie du Pêcheur, of  5 March 1996, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. 
57 Criteria as set out by Alessandra Silveira, in op. cit., p. 186, which also notes that the CJEU admits 
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It should be noted that a clear infringement of  EU law by the national court 
arises both in cases of  non-preliminary ruling – when required –58 59 or when the 
decision is made manifestly infringing the case law of  the Court of  Justice on the 
matter.
In turn, and as argued by the Attorney General P. Léger in recital 149 of  his 
conclusions – still within the framework of  the Köbler judgment – “proof  of  the causal 
link requires that the individual be in a position to establish that the failure to make a reference 
necessarily caused him actual and certain, not hypothetical, damage which would not have occurred 
if  the supreme court had decided to refer a question for a preliminary ruling.”
Note that it is also evident from the case law set by the CJEU that it is unlawful 
to limit the State’s liability to cases of  wilful misconduct or gross negligence of  the 
judge.60 
Take for example, the judgment of  the Court of  Appeal of  Coimbra, dated of  
10.14.2015, which emerged in the result of  the writ of  nolle prosequi by order of  a 
party to the main proceedings, which confirmed the foundations that have been in 
the genesis of  the decision by the Prosecutor’s Office that no further investigations 
would ensue.61
The defendant was indicted for committing a crime of  misuse for promoting, 
in his commercial establishment, “the public execution of  intellectual works protected by 
copyright, using for such a sound equipment on the three sound speakers through which the sound 
was propagated.”62
For this purpose, the party to the main proceedings claimed that the contested 
decision made an incorrect interpretation of  the concept of  communication of  work 
to the public under EU law, and in particular Directive 2001/29/EC. 
It also suggested that the Court refer the following questions to the CJEU:
 i) The concept of  communication of  work to the public provided for in 
Article 3 (1) of  Directive 2001/29/EC must be interpreted as covering 
the transmission of  broadcast works, in commercial establishments such 
as bars, to cafes, restaurants or other with similar characteristics, through 
reception television sets and disclosure which is amplified through 
speakers and/or amplifiers, setting to that extent, a new use of  copyright 
that “the requirement that the norm confers rights on individuals does not necessarily imply that the standard be 
provided with direct effect - much less so of  direct applicability.” 
58 I.e., when we are before the Court of  the national legal system from which there is no appeal. 
59 It is also urgent to pay attention to Judgement Cilfit, of  6 October 1982, Case 283/81,  where the 
CJEU adopted the following understanding: “the national court required to refer the question for preliminary 
ruling is exempted from this responsibility if  faced with: 1) a provision with a meaning so clear and obvious that 
it leaves no room for reasonable doubt concerning the solution of  the legal matter and the correct application of  
European Union law, or before 2) a firm statement or consolidated case law of  the CJEU,” i.e., if  the point of  
law at issue has already been settled by the CJEU, the binding precedent takes effect even if  one is 
not facing a factually identical situation (see, in this sense, Alessandra Silveira, op. cit., p.192). It is 
certain, moreover, that if  the judge wishes to evade the order of  obligation, taking advantage of  
the above-mentioned case law, it must substantiate its claim, in particular, demonstrating that the 
position adopted is the result of  case law of  the CJEU or there is no reasonable doubt in the case 
that imposes the reference for a preliminary ruling, otherwise incurring in liability. 
60 Judgment Traghetti del Mediterraneo, of  13 June 2006, Case C-173/03. 
61 Contrary to what happened with the position taken by the same Court in the preliminary ruling 
that gave rise to Case C-151/15 mentioned above. 
62 Cf. the judgment of  the Court of  Appeal of  Coimbra, dated of  10.14.2015. 
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protected works?, ii) the use of  speakers and/or amplifiers, i.e. different 
technical means different from the reception television set, to expand the 
sound reception influences the response to the previous question?63
Without envisaging the need for carrying out a reference for preliminary ruling 
– being, incidentally, completely silent on this point – and despite admitting that the 
position adopted is possibly a minority position throughout the EU, the Court of  
Appeal of  Coimbra essentially built on the case law set by the CLUJ No. 15/2013.
In addition to deciding against the CJEU on this matter, the Court of  Appeal 
of  Coimbra, despite being exhorted by the party to the main proceedings, did not 
request for a preliminary ruling, nor did it give reasons for its decision, stressing that 
the position adopted resulted from CJEU’s case law and stated that it did not appear 
to be any reasonable doubt in the proceedings that would impose the reference for 
a preliminary ruling.
As for us, there are no doubts that the rule infringed confers rights on individuals, 
as already said, namely the right to remuneration for public communication of  works.
Finally, there is a causal link between the infringement of  the obligation incumbent 
on the State and the damage suffered by the individual, i.e., the decision contrary to 
EU law necessarily caused the party to the main proceedings harm, actual and certain 
– equivalent to the remuneration due – and not hypothetical, and that would not have 
occurred if  the Court had decided in line with the case law of  the CJEU.
In addition to the responsibility of  the State Judge for breach of  EU law, it 
is worthwhile to acknowledge the possibility, in cases of  repeated practice, of  the 
Commission initiating infringement proceedings under Article 258 of  the CJEU 
against the infringing Member State.
In short, if  the national court encounters the distribution of  the sound made 
by speakers that amplifies it but, that are not part of  the television or radio, it should 
at the earliest point in time, check whether the criteria that we listed above and 
that result from the CJEU’s case law in judgments C-403/08, C-429/08, both of  
04.10.2011, and C-135/10, of  15.03.2012, are satisfied.
If  so, the judge should, in the vest of  a functionally European court, not 
apply the CLUJ No. 15/2013, from which derives the right to a new remuneration, 
pursuant to that stated in Articles 155 and 149 (2) of  the CRRC without prejudice 
to any criminal liabilty for the combined provisions of  Articles 195 and 197 of  the 
same law.
If  the Portuguese courts persist in welcoming the mentioned CLUJ, even 
in cases that fulfil all the criteria listed by the CJEU as revealing the concept of  
communication of  work to the public, they should be aware of  the possibility, on the 
one hand, of  indictment of  the Portuguese State by verification of  the requirements 
relating to State liability (judge) for breach of  EU law and, on the other, of  triggering 
infringement proceedings by the European Commission.
63 Idem.
